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BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY AND SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORTING QUALITY 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Based on the notion that a diverse board will take a more balanced view and pay greater 
attention to social responsibility and stakeholder concerns, this paper examines the effect of 
board gender diversity, measured using a range of proxies, on sustainability reporting quality. 
After controlling for corporate governance as well as firm reporting incentives, reporting 
behaviour and reporting environment, we find that gender diverse boards are associated with 
higher quality sustainability reports and independent female directors have greater effect on 
sustainability reporting quality than female directors. Our findings have implications for 
policy formulation and provide evidence for a softer ‘comply or explain’ (as opposed to quota 
based) approach to encourage board gender diversity and its effects on sustainability 
reporting quality. 
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BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY AND SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORTING QUALITY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the effect of board gender diversity on sustainability reporting quality. 
We use five alternative proxies for gender diversity and measure sustainability reporting 
quality using an index. Our study is based on the UK context which is characterised by a softer 
comply or explain approach (as opposed to a mandatory one), affecting change in boardrooms 
and corporate accountability. We provide evidence of gender diverse boards, in particular 
independent female directors, having a significant positive association with sustainability 
reporting quality after controlling for corporate governance characteristics and firm reporting 
incentives, reporting behaviour and reporting environment. 
Corporate governance reforms emphasise diversity in boardrooms (Higgs Report, 
2003; Davies Report, 2011; 2015; European Commission, 2014). Many companies are now 
increasingly issuing sustainability reports (Simnett, 2012; Mock et al., 2013)1. In the UK, the 
Higgs Report (2003) and the Davies Report (2011) recommended diversifying boards with 
people from a range of perspectives and backgrounds. Similarly, the European Commission 
(2012; 2014) has set targets for women on boards and its report on women in decision-making 
notes that the quality of ethical behaviour in companies is affected by the proportion of 
females on the board. This paper investigates the relationship between board gender diversity 
and sustainability reporting quality. 
                                                          
1 Sustainability reports include quantitative and qualitative information on financial/economic, 
social/ethical and environmental performance and seek to reflect a company’s economic, social and 
environmental behaviour (KPMG, 2011; GRI, 2013). Sustainability reports are a structured way an 
entity documents its economic, environmental and social performance that gives companies a means 
to report on how non-financial factors interact with financial ones and ultimately drive a company’s 
value (Mock et al., 2007; 2013). 
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Our examination of the effects of board gender diversity on sustainability reporting 
quality differs from and extends prior research in a number of ways. First, countries differ in 
their approach to promoting board gender diversity. Unlike the mandatory quota approach 
adopted, for example, in Norway and Spain, the UK has a voluntary approach to promoting 
good corporate governance practice. The Higgs Report (2003) on the role of non-executive 
directors argued that diversity on boards can enhance their effectiveness. Subsequently, the 
Davies Report (2011) recommended that listed companies should establish policy concerning 
boardroom diversity and set measurable objectives for its implementation. The latest Davies 
Report (2015) reviewing board gender diversity observes that the UK voluntary approach is 
working. Unlike prior research on gender effects in accounting which are predominantly 
based on data from the US (see Srinidhi et al., 2011; Gul et al., 2011; Gul et al., 2013), or 
Australia (see Hodge et al., 2009; Chapple and Humphrey 2014; Capezio and Mavisakalyan, 
2015) or cross-country (see Mock et al., 2007; Ruhnke and Gabriel, 2013; Junior et al., 2014), 
our study is based on the UK context where there is a paucity of research on gender effects on 
sustainability reporting quality. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to provide 
recent evidence on the effect of board gender diversity, in particular of independent female 
directors, on sustainability reporting quality.  
Second, in focusing on the effect of board gender diversity on sustainability reporting 
quality, we examine a range of measures of gender diversity: number of female directors on 
the board, the proportion of female directors on the board, number of independent female 
directors on the board and the Shannon and Blau indices of diversity. This contrasts, for 
example, with Liao et al. (2015) whose focus is on the effect of percentage of female directors 
on whether a firm discloses participation in the carbon emission project. 
Third, our focus is not on a particular disclosure, for example whether a company 
discloses participation in a carbon emission project measured using a dummy (cf Liao et al., 
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2015), but rather on sustainability reporting quality which we measure using an index.2 We 
thus go beyond mere sustainability disclosure. Our focus contrasts, for example, with the 
cross-country study of Simnett et al. (2009) which does not investigate the effect of corporate 
governance on sustainability reporting quality. The typology applied in our paper helps in 
assessing sustainability reporting quality by applying thresholds compared to the 
dichotomous measure used by Liao et al. (2015) or the two step approach used in Simnett et 
al. (2009).3 We also undertake additional analysis and examine specifically the effect of board 
gender diversity on whether a company has a separate sustainability committee and whether 
its sustainability report is externally assured.  
Fourth, we recognise that sustainability reporting quality could be affected by some 
underlying firm characteristics. Thus in examining the effect of board gender diversity on 
sustainability reporting quality we control for the effect of firm reporting incentives, reporting 
environment and reporting behaviour.4 We provide evidence that after controlling for these 
firm related characteristics, board gender diversity has a positive significant association with 
sustainability reporting quality.  
Our paper is related to but also markedly different from Liao et al. (2015): (i) their focus 
is on examining whether a firm discloses its participation in the carbon disclosure project 
whereas we focus on sustainability reporting quality; (ii) their study relies on diversity 
measured using the percentage of female directors whereas we use a number of proxies of 
gender diversity including independent female directors; (iii) their study does not take into 
                                                          
2 This is on a scale of 0-4, whereby we score a firm 0 if it does not publish a sustainability report; 1= if 
sustainability report exists; 2= if sustainability report exists and the company has a sustainability 
committee affiliated with the board of directors; 3= if sustainability report exists and the report is 
assured by an external assurer provided by a non-audit firm; score 4= if sustainability report exists and 
is externally assured by one of the Big 4 or other audit firm. 
3 Simnett et al. (2013) used a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if sustainability reports are assured 
and 0 otherwise in the first step, whereas in the second step, it tests whether the assurance provider 
belongs to the audit profession. 
4 We follow Daske et al. (2013) and use factor analysis technique in controlling for these firm specific 
characteristics.  
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consideration firm specific characteristics that might influence the disclosure of participation 
in the carbon disclosure project whereas we provide evidence that after controlling for firm 
reporting incentives, reporting behaviour and reporting environment, gender diverse boards 
have a positive significant effect on sustainability reporting quality. 
Overall, controlling for corporate governance characteristics, reporting incentives, 
reporting behaviour, and reporting environment, we find that gender diverse boards are 
associated with higher quality sustainability reports and independent female directors have 
greater effect on sustainability reporting quality than female directors. Moreover, proxies that 
capture incentives for more transparent reporting also have a significant and positive 
association with sustainability reporting quality. Our results are supported by detailed testing 
of model specification and sensitivity analysis, including tests dealing with size effects and 
correlated variables issues. Our analysis is based on a sample of companies listed in 2012 in 
the UK FTSE350, operating under a softer comply or explain approach to governance and 
board diversity (Adams, 2015), and provides recent evidence on the effect of board gender 
diversity on sustainability reporting quality. 
The remainder of the paper is presented in four further sections.  The next section 
reviews the literature in order to develop hypotheses. The third section sets out the research 
study in terms of sample, data and model. A fourth section reports the empirical results. The 
final section provides a summary and draws conclusions.  
 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
In this section of the paper we explore prior research related to board gender diversity and 
sustainability reporting to develop our hypotheses. We do not aim to review the whole 
literature, but rather focus on papers pertinent to establishing the potential effect of gender 
diversity on sustainability reporting quality. We first cover sustainability reporting and then 
gender diversity effects.  
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Sustainability Reporting Quality 
Sustainability reports include quantitative and qualitative information on 
financial/economic, social/ethical and environmental performance and seek to reflect a 
company’s economic, social and environmental behaviour (GRI, 2013). The existence of 
sustainability reports does not mean an increase in the quality of the reported information 
(Junior et al., 2014). Simnett et al. (2009) find that assurance of sustainability reports enhances 
the credibility and reliability of reports and helps to build corporate reputation. Concerns 
about the integrity of information disclosed in reports lead to demands for more transparent 
reports. Firms respond to these demands by providing external independent assurance on 
sustainability reports. Previous studies suggest assurance of sustainability reports enhances 
their quality, and that the quality of these reports will be greater when assurance is provided 
by an auditing profession (see for example Hodge et al., 2009; Manetti and Becatti, 2009; 
Simnett et al., 2009; GRI, 2013;). Junior et al. (2014) provide a historical analysis of 
sustainability reporting and assurance of sustainability reports. They argue that sustainability 
reports help enhance dialogue among stakeholders and hence improve the decision-making 
process. 
 
Board Diversity Matters 
Our expectations of the effect of gender diversity on sustainability reporting quality is based 
on a review of the literature which provides a number of interrelated reasons. First, diversity 
on boards may affect decision making due to more varied perspectives and non-traditional 
approaches to problems (Adams et al., 2015). A diverse board might signal its understanding 
of the business environment (Miller and Triana, 2009; Triana et al., 2013) and may increase the 
ability of boards to recognize the interests of a variety of stakeholder groups (Harjoto et al., 
2014). It may also help companies benefit from expertise of individuals who can provide a 
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variety of resources including prestige, legitimacy, financing, knowledge and diversity 
(Terjesen et al., 2009). 
Second, female directors are not mere tokens but are different from their male 
counterparts and have different priorities (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Adams and Funk, 2012). 
Female directors differ in leadership styles (Bear et al., 2010) and are more likely to support 
community group and social responsibility projects (Hillman et al., 2002). The presence of 
female directors on boards can reinforce mechanisms of stakeholder engagement and increase 
the credibility of corporate reports (Manetti and Toccafondi, 2012). Also, female directors 
differ from male directors in terms of personality, communication style, educational 
background and career experience (Liao, et al., 2015). Female directors are more averse to 
litigation and reputation loss (Srinidhi et al., 2011). Due to these differences a gender diverse 
board may affect sustainability reporting quality.  
Third, female directors are more likely to be stakeholder oriented, concerned about 
ethical practices and socially responsible behaviour and also be inclined to take actions to 
reduce perceived risks (Carter et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Adams (2015) reports 
that there are differences in ethical behaviour between women and men, and female directors 
have different values and are more stakeholder oriented than male directors. Females tend to 
adopt a more trust-building relationship compared to males and thus may put more emphasis 
on greater engagement with stakeholders and in reducing information asymmetry (Gul et al., 
2013). In addition they are more sensitive to social and ethical issues (Bear et al., 2010; Hafsi 
and Turgut, 2013; Isidro and Sobral, 2014).  It is thus likely that due to females’ higher concerns 
for social responsibility issues and greater stakeholder orientation a gender diverse board may 
affect sustainability reporting quality.  
 Our expectations of a gender diverse board affecting sustainability reporting quality 
is further supported by empirical research. The relationship between gender and firm 
performance continues to be the subject of much research but findings are often mixed 
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(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009).5 However, research examining the 
impact of gender diversity on firm level financial outcomes such as earnings quality (Krishnan 
and Parsons, 2008), earnings management (Srinidhi et al., 2011), stock price informativeness 
(Gul et al., 2011), and analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy (Gul et al., 2013) suggests that board 
diversity adds to the transparency of financial reports and reduces information asymmetry.  
 More recent empirical research also suggests that board gender diversity may affect 
reporting quality, compliance and ethical behaviour. Bear et al. (2010), Hafsi and Turgut (2013) 
and Harjoto et al. (2014) for instance provide evidence of a link between gender diversity and 
corporate social responsibility. Bear et al. (2010) find that an increase in the number of female 
directors on boards is associated with an increase in corporate social responsibility ratings. 
Liao et al. (2015) find a positive association between percentage of female directors on boards 
and voluntary disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions.  
Recent research on sustainability reporting quality does not consider the effect of 
corporate governance. Adams and Ferreira (2009) observe female directors appear to have 
similar impact to that of independent directors. Independent female directors may demand 
greater sustainability reporting quality. In examining the effect of gender diversity it is 
important to recognise that gender effects may be subsumed by other board characteristics 
(Srinidhi et al., 2011). In particular, it is important to investigate if female independent 
directors have an effect on sustainability reporting quality after controlling for board 
independence. 
                                                          
5 For example, Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) find that existence of women on boards does not in 
itself affect firm value, but diversity of the board has a positive association with firm value. In contrast 
to Erhardt et al. (2003), Carter et al. (2010) do not find a significant association between gender diversity 
and firm performance for a sample of US firms. For a sample of Canadian firms, Francoeur et al. (2008) 
find that firms with a higher proportion of females on boards and top management positions generate 
positive and significant abnormal returns. In contrast, using a portfolio approach for a sample of 
Australian firms, Chapple and Humphrey (2014) do not find an association between diversity and 
performance.  
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The above discussion on gender diversity and sustainability reporting quality leads us 
to posit that gender diverse boards may affect sustainability reporting quality. In this paper 
we test the following hypotheses: 
H1:  Female directors have a positive association with sustainability reporting quality. 
H2: Independent female directors have a positive association with sustainability reporting 
quality. 
H3: Gender diverse boards have a positive association with sustainability reporting quality. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
Model Specification 
To test our hypotheses we use the following model: 
SUSQUAL=  =+1DIVERSITY+2BODSIZE+3BODIND+4BODMEET+5RI+6RB+
7RE+8IND+ℇ 
where: 
SUSQUAL=  sustainability reporting quality on 0-4 scale [0= no sustainability reports 
exist; 1= sustainability reports exist; 2= sustainability reports exist and 
the company has a sustainability committee affiliated with the board of 
directors; 3= sustainability reports exist and assurance is provided by  
a non-audit firm; 4= sustainability reports exists and is externally 
assured by a one of the Big 4 or other audit firm] 
DIVERSITY= board gender DIVERSITY measured using FIVE alternatives:  
BODFEM= number of female directors on board;  
PRFEM= proportion of female directors on board;  
BODINDFEM= number of independent female directors on board;  
SHANNON= Shannon index of diversity [=- ∑ni=1 Pi ln(Pi) where Pi is 
the percentage of board members in each category (two: male/female) 
and n is the total number of board members] 
BLAU= Blau index of diversity [= 1- ∑ni=1 Pi2 where Pi is the percentage 
of board members in each category (two: male/female) and n is the total 
number of board members] 
BODSIZE= number of directors on the board 
BODIND= proportion of independent directors on the board 
BODMEET= number of board meetings held during the year 
RI= reporting incentive factor (a single factor reflecting the strength of a 
firm’s reporting incentives from various firm characteristics (i.e. size, 
leverage, return on assets, book to market ratio, percent of closely held 
shares, and percent of foreign sales) 
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RB= reporting behaviour factor (the absolute value of accruals scaled by the 
absolute value of cash flows from operations) 
RE= reporting environment factor (the natural log of the number of analysts 
following the firm) 
IND= industry dummy variable  
ℇ= error term 
 
Data and Variables 
In examining the effect of board gender diversity on sustainability reporting quality we rely 
on a number of alternative measures of diversity. We also focus on the quality of sustainability 
reporting using a coding scale based on four thresholds, i.e. using a score of 0-4 to provide an 
indicator of the quality of information disclosed in these reports. The scores are: 0= if 
sustainability reports do not exist; 1= if sustainability reports exist; 2= if sustainability reports 
exist and the company has a sustainability committee affiliated with the board of directors; 3= 
if sustainability reports exist and assurance is provided by a non-audit firm); 4= if 
sustainability reports exist and are assured by one of the Big 4 or other audit firm. For the 
purpose of additional analysis, we also apply other measures of sustainability quality, i.e. we 
use ASSURANCE which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if sustainability reports are externally 
assured and 0 otherwise and COMMITTEE which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a 
sustainability committee exists and 0 otherwise.6  
We measure gender diversity using five alternative measures to check the robustness 
of our findings. They are: the number of female directors on board (BODFEM), proportion of 
female directors on board (PRFEM), number of independent female directors on board 
(BODINDFEM), Blau (BLAU) and Shannon (SHANNON) indices of diversity.7 
We recognise the importance of controlling for corporate governance (Srinidhi et al., 
2011; Zaman et al., 2011) in testing the effect of board gender diversity on sustainability 
                                                          
6 Our focus on reporting quality thus contrasts with Liao et al. (2015) who use a dummy measure of 
whether a firm discloses its participation in the greenhouse gas emission project.  
7 We have calculated Shannon and Blau indices following Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008). 
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reporting quality. Prior literature suggests that larger boards are more likely to be diverse and 
have directors from different backgrounds, and that this in turn may lead to the company 
paying greater attention to sustainability issues (De Villiers et al., 2011). We include board size 
(BODSIZE) measured by the total number of directors on board. Similarly, selection of a 
greater number of independent directors is associated with a reduction in agency costs, 
increased legitimacy and greater interest in sustainability (Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011). We 
thus include board independence (BODIND) defined as the proportion of outside directors to 
the total number of directors on the board. The number of board meetings held in a year can 
affect the level of transparency and quality of the information disclosed as well as the 
effectiveness of board decision making (Laksmana, 2008; Liao et al., 2015). We include number 
of board meetings (BODMEET) as another governance variable.8 
Sustainability reporting quality may be affected by some underlying reporting 
incentives and reporting behaviour factors.  Unlike studies such as Ball et al. (2003), Leuz et 
al. (2003) and Burgstahler et al. (2006) which focus on cross-country institutional differences 
as a driver of reporting incentives, Daske et al. (2013) investigate within-country reporting 
incentives based on a firm level approach. Following Daske et al. (2013: 498), we construct 
three proxies to identify factors that determine firms’ incentives for reporting and factors that 
reflect firms’ actual behaviour. The first proxy is input based and captures firm characteristics 
affecting management reporting incentives (RI). These are: firm size (natural log of total 
assets), profitability (return on assets), financial leverage (debt to total assets ratio), growth 
opportunities (book-to-market ratio), ownership concentration (percentage of closely-held 
shares), and internationalization (foreign sales over total sales). We use factor analysis to 
summarise the incentive effects from these firm characteristics and extract a single factor. 
                                                          
8 We also controlled for CEO duality but this variable was dropped from the regression due to lack of 
statistical variations in its value across firms: 96.58% of firms in our sample do not have duality role 
whereas 3.42% do.  
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Factor analysis technique helps in constructing a single factor indicating the strength of a 
firm’s reporting incentives from various firm characteristics (Daske et al., 2013). We then 
compute the level of a firm reporting incentive in year t as the rolling average of the raw factor 
scores over the year t to t-2. Higher values denote greater reporting incentives. We expect 
firms with bigger size, larger profit, larger financing needs, more growth opportunities, more 
concentrated ownership structure and greater internationalisation to be associated with 
higher sustainability reporting quality. 
We also use output based proxies to capture the reporting behaviour of firms and their 
external reporting environment. We capture firm reporting behaviour (RB) using an accrual-
based proxy for earnings quality. We measure firm reporting behaviour following Daske et 
al. (2013) as the absolute value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flows from 
operations. We then compute the level of firm reporting behaviour in year t as the rolling 
average of the raw measures over the year t to t-2. We multiply the metric by -1 so that higher 
values denote less earning management and more transparent reporting. We also capture the 
external reporting environment (RE) using the number of analysts following the firm. We then 
compute the level of a firm’s reporting environment in year t as the rolling average of the 
natural log of annual number of analysts (plus one) over the years t to t-2. Higher values 
denote more external pressures from analysts (Daske et al., 2013).9 
Finally, we control for industry classification (IND) using the DataStream industry 
classification benchmark (ICB) level 1 industries (ten groups). Our study is based on an initial 
sample of all the companies listed in 2012 in the UK FTSE350. Elimination of companies with 
missing data reduces the sample size to 333 firms. The Global Reporting Initiative database is 
the main source for our dependent variable. We supplemented it with information extracted 
                                                          
9 Following Daske et al. (2013) we set analyst following to zero when firms do not have coverage in 
I/B/E/S database. 
GSQUAL PROOFREAD|Page 13 of 34 
 
from the 2012 annual reports of the sample firms. We relied on annual reports for data on 
corporate governance variables and sourced data on financial variables from DataStream. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 1. We report the 
mean and distributional characteristics for each of the variables used in our analysis. Panel A 
shows the distribution of the dependent variable. It shows that 173 (51.95%) firms do not 
publish sustainability reports whereas 160 (48.04%) firms do. There are 51 firms (15.32%) that 
have their sustainability reports externally assured by a Big 4 or other audit firm. These firms 
may be considered higher quality in terms of sustainability reporting.  
Table 1 Panel B provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our model. 
The mean sustainability quality score (SUSQUAL) is 1.114. We also find that 17.4% of our 
sample companies have their sustainability reports externally assured by either an audit firm 
or a non-audit firm and 36% have a separate committee with responsibility for sustainability 
reporting. With regard to board gender diversity, we find the number of female directors on 
boards (BODFEM) ranges from 0-5 with a mean of 1.435 while the mean value of independent 
female directors on boards (BODINDFEM) is 1.205. The percentage of female directors on 
boards (PRFEM) is 14.1%. This is higher than the 9.2% reported in Liao et al. (2015) for their 
sample of 2011 CDP FTSE350 firms and indicates that there has been an increase in the 
proportion of female directors on boards in 2012 compared to 2011, consistent with recent 
trends in the UK (Davies Report, 2015). The other two proxies for board gender diversity, i.e. 
the Blau and Shannon indices, have a mean of 0.348 and 0.218 respectively which is higher 
than the 0.053 (for Blau) and 0.089 (for Shannon) reported by Campbell and Minguez-Vera. 
(2008) for a sample of firms listed on the continuous market in Spain during 1995-2000.  
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In terms of governance characteristics, we find the mean board size (BODSIZE) is 
9.336. This is similar to Liao et al. (2015) who reported a mean of 9.0 directors. Independent 
directors (BODIND) account for 51% of board members which means that half of the board 
members are independent. Our finding is lower than the 54.5% mean reported by Liao et al. 
(2015) and the 58% mean reported by Zaman et al. (2011). The mean number of board meetings 
is 8.18. It is close to the mean of 8.78 reported by Zaman et al. (2011) and 8.4 reported by Liao 
et al. (2015). The mean for firm reporting incentive (RI) is 0.006, reporting behaviour (RB) is -
2.835, and reporting environment (RE) is 3.233.  
Table 1 Panel C reports mean values of key variables by industry. We find that the 
basic materials industry has the highest score for sustainability reporting quality followed by 
utilities, consumer goods, and oil and gas. The financials industry has the lowest score of 
0.537. The basic materials industry also has the highest mean for ASSURANCE, i.e. 48% of 
firms within this category have their sustainability reports externally assured. This contrasts 
with the financial industry which has a mean of 1%. We also find that consumer goods 
industry has the highest mean of 0.625 for COMMITTEE, i.e. existence of a sustainability 
committee, whereas financials have the lowest mean of 0.21. With regard to board gender 
diversity, we find that the utilities industry has the highest mean for: proportion of female 
directors on boards (PRFEM=0.184), number of independent female directors on boards 
(BODINDFEM=1.714), Blau index (mean of 0.468) and Shannon index (mean of 0.295). 
Table 1 Panel D presents descriptive statistics for diversity when we split our sample 
into three groups: firms with zero female directors on the board, firms with one female 
director on the board and firms with more than one female director on the board. The panel 
shows 75 (22.522%) firms do not have any female directors, 113 (33.933%) firms have one 
female director and 145 (43.543%) firms have more than one female director on their boards. 
UK companies seem to be more gender diverse when compared, for example, with Australian 
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ASX300 companies.10 Our descriptive statistics show that firms with more than one female 
director have the highest mean score for sustainability reporting quality (i.e. 
SUSQUAL=1.298), whereas firms with one female director have a mean of 1.026 and those 
with no female directors have a mean of 0.844. We also find that firms that have one female 
director (mean BODMEET=8.354) or more than one female director (mean BODMEET=8.344) 
on the board have more active boards than the ones with no female director (mean 
BODMEET=7.372) on the board, larger board size (mean BODSIZE=10.572) and highest 
proportion of independent directors on the board (mean BODIND=0.547) than firms without 
a female director.    
 
 [Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for variables used in our analysis. We find that 
sustainability reporting quality (SUSQUAL) has a positive and significant association with 
gender diversity (BODFEM in Panel A and BODINDFEM in Panel B), board size (BODSIZE), 
board meetings (BODMEET), reporting incentive (RI), reporting behaviour (RB) and reporting 
environment (RE).11 Overall, the correlations are consistent with the hypothesised relationship 
between board gender diversity and sustainability reporting quality. Table 2 shows no 
correlation above 0.5 among the variables of interest, therefore multicollinearity is not an 
issue.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Empirical Tests and Findings  
                                                          
10 Chapple and Humphrey (2014) find only 52% of the 288 companies in their sample of ASX300 listed 
companies in 2011 had at least one female director. 
11 We also run correlations using other measures of gender diversity i.e. PRFEM, BLAU, and 
SHANNON. The results, not tabulated, are generally consistent with those in Table 2. 
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Table 3 shows the results for our hypotheses relating to the impact of gender diversity on 
sustainability reporting quality. The main regression model is run in parts. Panel A Table 3 
shows the regressions for the full sample. Models 3.1-3.5 test the impact of gender diversity 
on sustainability reporting quality (SUSQUAL) using different measures of diversity. We use 
ordered-Probit specification for the analysis because the dependent variable (SUSQUAL) 
represents a 0-4 ascending scale variable.12 Models 3.6-3.10 repeat the tests after dropping the 
correlated variable BODSIZE. 
To test hypothesis 1 we use the number of female directors on boards (Model 3.1) and 
proportion of female directors on boards (Model 3.2). To test our second hypothesis we use 
number of independent female directors on boards (model 3.3). Models 3.4 and 3.5 test 
hypothesis 3 and use Blau and Shannon indices of diversity. Results show a marginal 
significant impact of gender diversity on sustainability reporting quality (Models 3.1 and 3.3) 
but this is largely affected by the correlated variable BODSIZE.  
When we drop correlated variable board size, we find variables measuring gender 
diversity are significant and positive at the 1% level (Models 3.6 and 3.8).  The coefficient of 
BODINDFEM (Model 3.3 and 3.8) is slightly higher than the coefficient for BODFEM (Model 
3.1 and 3.6) suggesting that the effect of independent female directors on sustainability 
reporting quality is greater than that of female directors. Models 3.9 and 3.10 test hypothesis 
3, i.e. the impact of Blau and Shannon indices of diversity on sustainability reporting quality. 
We obtain similar results for both indices (both significant at 5% level) indicating a positive 
and significant impact on sustainability reporting quality.13 Board size (BODSIZE) is positive 
                                                          
12 We note this contrasts with Liao et al. (2015) who use Probit analysis with their dependent variable 
as a dummy indicator for whether a firm disclosed participation in the carbon emission project. In our 
further analysis when we focus on sustainability assurance and on sustainability committee we use 
logit analysis. 
13 Although as shown in Table 2 the magnitude of pairwise correlations among BODSIZE and other 
variables are not greater than 0.5, we identify that the correlation between BODFEM and BODSIZE is 
0.486 and between BODINDFEM and BODSIZE is 0.465 which may be considered as relatively high. 
To alleviate this potential multicollinearity problem, we followed the method suggested by Choi et al. 
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and significant in all models, and provides evidence of large boards affecting the quality of 
sustainability reporting.14 We also find reporting incentives (RI) has a significant and positive 
association with sustainability reporting quality in all models, and reporting environment 
(RE) has a significant and positive association with sustainability reporting quality in most 
models. This is consistent with the idea that these proxies capture incentives for more 
transparent reporting. Their significant impact increases when we drop the correlated variable 
BODSIZE. Reporting behaviour (RB) is not significant in the regression models but industry 
sectors have a positive association with sustainability reporting quality. The association is 
significant for oil and gas, basic materials, industrials and consumer goods industries. 
We divide the sample into small size firms and big size firms based on median15 to 
check whether our results are impacted by the size factor. Splitting the sample into small and 
large sized firms assists in analysing the effect of gender on sustainability reporting quality 
beyond any size effect. In Table 3 Panel B we report the results for small firms (Models 3.11-
3.15) and for large firms (Models 3.16-3.20). Our results for the sample of small firms show 
that gender diversity measured by the five alternative measures are all positive and have a 
significant association with sustainability reporting quality. For the small firms subsample 
reporting incentive (RI) is positive and significant in all models. The results are similar for 
large firms (Models 3.16-3.20) – all gender diversity measures have a positive association with 
sustainability reporting quality, although only BODFEM and BODINDFEM are significant.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
                                                          
(2008) by repeating the analysis after excluding correlated variables. We also use residuals obtained 
from regressing BODSIZE on BODFEM and BODINDFEM to replace the raw data of BODSIZE. Our 
findings (untabulated) are qualitatively similar to the original ones. 
14 This is consistent with Liao et al. (2015) who find larger boards are associated with disclosure of a 
firm’s participation in the carbon emission project. It is also consistent with De Villiers et al. (2011) who 
observe that larger boards are more likely to be diverse and include directors from different 
background and interests including corporate social responsibility. 
15 We measure size using total assets. 
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Additional Analysis  
In Table 4 we report the results when we include board size as a categorical variable in the 
main regression model along with explanatory variables to investigate the impact of different 
levels of board size.16 Following Gelman and Park (2009) we divide BODSIZE into four-level 
categories.17 The percentage of firms with BODSIZE of up to 7 directors is 12.61% (n=42), 8-10 
directors is 42.04% (n=140), 11-14 directors is 37.53% (n=125), and 15-21 directors is 7.80% 
(n=26) 18(untabulated). Results show that gender diversity measured by BODFEM, 
BODINDFEM, BLAU and SHANNON indices have a significant and positive association with 
sustainability reporting quality.19 We thus find additional support for our hypotheses that 
gender diverse boards have a positive significant association with sustainability reporting 
quality.  
 
 [Table 4 about here] 
 
We also use alternative measures of sustainability reporting quality, i.e. ASSURANCE 
and COMMITTEE, to assess the robustness of our findings. Both measures are dummy 
variables and thus we use a logit specification test. In the models reported in Table 5 we use 
                                                          
16 We follow Gelman and Park (2009) who argue that discretization can be beneficial in helping the 
communication of regression results. Although discretization can lead to some information loss, this 
can be reduced by choosing the cut-off points adaptively (O’Brien, 2004).  
17 Choosing cut-off points 7, 10, 14, and 21 enables us to estimate the optimum partition from the data 
(O’Brien, 2004) and reduce generated missing values.  
18 The choice of an optimal cut-off point is determined from the training set. This is approached by 
trying more than one value and choosing that which in some sense gives the most satisfactory results. 
In practice, the search may be restricted to the central 80 or 90% of observations (which explains the 
existence of missing values). Moreover, we need to look at the Ns of subcategories and make sure they 
are not too small. If the Ns in some subcategories are too small, we might need to combine some 
adjacent categories because cut-off points that do not satisfactory differ from each other might be 
problematic. 
19 We also divided BODSIZE into 25%, 50% and 75% quartiles. The results are consistent with those 
based on cut-off points used following O’Brien (2004). 
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ASSURANCE as a measure of sustainability reporting quality. We find gender diversity 
measured using both the number of female directors on boards and number of independent 
female directors on boards has a positive and significant association with ASSURANCE, i.e. 
whether a company’s sustainability report is externally assured (Table 5).  
When we use COMMITTEE, the existence of sustainability committee, we find all our 
measures of gender diversity (i.e. BODFEM, PRFEM, BODINDFEM, BLAU and SHANNON) 
are significant and positive (see Table 6). Overall, the results are consistent with our main 
findings and provide additional support for the hypothesised relationship between board 
gender diversity and sustainability reporting quality.20 
 
[Table 5 and 6 about here] 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines the relationship between board gender diversity and sustainability 
reporting quality. It investigates whether gender diversity measured using five alternative 
measures (i.e. number of female directors on board, the proportion of female directors on 
board, number of independent female directors on board; and the Shannon and Blau indices 
of diversity) is associated with higher sustainability reporting quality. The paper also 
investigates if governance factors, i.e. board size, board meetings and board independence, 
are associated with sustainability reporting quality. Additionally, following Daske et al. (2013) 
we control for reporting incentives, reporting behaviour, and reporting environment which 
                                                          
20 As an additional test we also follow the portfolio approach adopted in Chapple and Humphrey (2014) 
and split our firms into three subsamples: firms with no female director; firms with one female director 
and firms with more than one female director. Chapple and Humphrey (2014) suggest that splitting a 
sample into portfolios helps in mitigating issues arising from omitted variables, heterogeneity, and 
simultaneous issues among variables. Our untabulated results are consistent with our main findings 
and support our hypothesis that board gender diversity affects sustainability reporting quality. The 
effect is most pronounced for the more than one female director subsample. 
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may affect sustainability reporting. We proxy for sustainability reporting quality using a score 
system where the absence of sustainability reporting has the lowest score and sustainability 
reports that are independently assured by one of the Big 4 or other  audit firm have the highest 
score.  
Using a sample of all companies listed in 2012 in the UK FTSE350 and applying 
different empirical tests dealing with correlated variables, heterogeneity and omitted 
variables issues, and after controlling for corporate governance as well as firm incentives, firm 
behaviour and firm environment, we find that board gender diversity has a positive and 
significant association with sustainability reporting quality. Our analysis also shows that 
reporting incentives (RI) has a significant and positive association with sustainability 
reporting quality. Dividing the sample into small and large sized firms enables us to examine 
the impact of gender diversity beyond any size effects. We find all our board gender diversity 
measures are significant for the small sized sample whereas in the large sized sample all the 
gender diversity measures have a positive association with sustainability reporting quality 
although only BODFEM and BODINDFEM are significant. Additional tests dealing with 
board size correlated effects by applying categorisation of board size show that gender 
diversity has a significant and positive association with sustainability quality reporting in 
most models. Sensitivity tests using alternative measures of sustainability reporting quality 
(i.e. whether the report is externally assured and whether the company has a sustainability 
committee) are also consistent with our main findings.  
Our paper has a few limitations. The findings are restricted to companies listed in 2012 
in the UK FTSE350 and thus are relatively large, but do account for a significant proportion of 
companies based on market value. Since corporate governance and board gender diversity 
recommendations vary internationally, further research examining the effect of board gender 
diversity on the quality of reporting, including their impact on decisions relating to 
sustainability and assurance, in different institutional and regulatory contexts would make 
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valuable contribution to the literature. Moreover, our paper focuses on the association 
between board gender diversity and sustainability reporting quality and not on causation. 
Future research would benefit from a focus on the black box of governance (Turley and 
Zaman, 2007; Nielsen and Huse, 2010; Ben-Amar et al., 2013) and examining the process via 
which board diversity affects reporting quality and the costs and benefits of sustainability 
reporting (Simnett and Huggins, 2015). 
Overall, the analysis in our paper provides evidence of gender diverse boards having 
a positive significant association with sustainability reporting quality. This is consistent with 
the view that female representation on boards of directors affects the quality of corporate 
reporting. Our findings are underpinned by detailed testing of model specification and 
sensitivity analysis, including tests dealing with size confounding effects and correlation 
among variables. Our study has important implications for policy making. It provides 
evidence on the effect of the voluntary softer comply or explain approach (Adams, 2015), as 
opposed to the mandatory quota used in many countries, towards encouraging board gender 
diversity on sustainability reporting quality. Our results contribute to the growing body of 
literature highlighting the importance of board diversity and governance when considering 
sustainability reporting and assurance issues at the firm level.  
 
  
GSQUAL PROOFREAD|Page 22 of 34 
 
REFERENCES 
Adams, R. 2015. Myths and Facts about Female Directors. Washington: International Finance 
Corporation. 
Adams, R., & Ferreira, D. 2009. “Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance 
and performance”. Journal of Financial Economics, 94(2), 291–309. 
Adams, R., & Funk, P. 2012. “Beyond the glass ceiling: does gender matter?” Management 
Science, 58(2), 219-235. 
Adams, R., de Haan, J., Terjesen, S., & van Ees, H. 2015. “Board diversity: moving the field 
forward”. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 23(2), 77-82. 
Arora, P., & Dharwadkar, R. 2011. “Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR): The moderating roles of attainment discrepancy and organization slack”. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19(2), 136-152. 
Ball, R., Robin, A., & Wu, J. S. 2003. “Incentives versus standards: properties of accounting 
income in four East Asian countries”. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1), 235-
270. 
Bear, S., Rahman, N., & Post, C. 2010. “The impact of board diversity and gender composition 
on corporate social responsibility and firm reputation”. Journal of Business Ethics, 97(2), 
207-221. 
Ben‐Amar, W., Francoeur, C., Hafsi, T., & Labelle, R. 2013. “What makes better boards? A 
closer look at diversity and ownership”. British Journal of Management, 24(1), 85-101. 
Burgstahler, D. C., Hail, L., & Leuz, C. 2006. “The importance of reporting incentives: Earnings 
management in European private and public firms”. The Accounting Review, 81(5), 983-
1016. 
Campbell, K., & Mínguez-Vera, A. 2008. “Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm 
financial performance”. Journal of Business Ethics, 83 (3), 435-451. 
GSQUAL PROOFREAD|Page 23 of 34 
 
Capezio, A. & Mavisakalyan, A. 2015. ”Women in the boardroom and fraud: Evidence from 
Australia”. Australian Journal of Management, 1-16. 
Carter, D., D’Souza, F., Simkins, B., & Simpson, W. 2010. “The gender and ethnic diversity of 
US boards and board committees and firm financial performance”. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 18(5), 396–414. 
Carter, D., Simkins, B., & Simpson, W. G. 2003. “Corporate governance, board diversity, and 
firm value”. Financial Review, 38(1), 33–53. 
Chapple, L., & Humphrey, J. E. 2014. “Does board gender diversity have a financial impact? 
Evidence using stock portfolio performance”. Journal of Business Ethics, 122(4), 709-723. 
Choi, J. H., Kim, J. B., Liu, X., & Simunic, D. A. 2008. “Audit pricing, legal liability regimes 
and Big 4 premiums: Theory and cross-country evidence”. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 25(1), 55–99. 
Daske, H., Hail, L., Leuz, C., & Verdi, R. 2013. “Adopting a label: Heterogeneity in the 
economic consequences around IAS/IFRS adoptions”. Journal of Accounting Research, 
51(3), 495-547. 
Davies Report. 2011. Women on boards: an independent review into women on boards. Technical 
Report, Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS), London.  
Davies Report. 2015. Improving the Gender Balance in British Boards. Women on Boards: London. 
De Villiers, C., Naiker, V., & Van Staden, C.J. 2011. “The effect of board characteristics on firm 
environmental performance”. Journal of Management, 37, 1636-1663. 
Erhardt, N.L., Werbel, J.D., & Shrader, C.B. 2003. “Board of director diversity and firm 
financial performance”. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 11(2), 102-111. 
European Commission. 2012. Women in decision-making in the EU. Brussels: European Union. 
European Commission. 2014. Improving the gender balance in company boardrooms. Brussels: 
European Union. 
GSQUAL PROOFREAD|Page 24 of 34 
 
Francoeur, C., Labelle, R., & Sinclair-Desgagne, B. 2008. “Gender diversity in corporate 
governance and top management”. Journal of Business Ethics, 81(1), 83–95. 
Gelman, A., & Park, D. K. 2009. “Splitting a predictor at the upper quarter or third and the 
lower quarter or third”. The American Statistician, 63(1), 1-8. 
GRI [Global Reporting Initiative]. 2013. Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, Boston: GRI. 
Gul, F. A., Hutchinson, M., & Lai, K. M. 2013. “Gender-diverse boards and properties of 
analyst earnings forecasts”. Accounting Horizons, 27(3), 511-538. 
Gul, F.A., Srinidhi, B., & Ng, A.C. 2011. “Does board gender diversity improve the 
informativeness of stock prices?”. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(3), 314-338. 
Hafsi, T., & Turgut, G. 2013. “Boardroom diversity and its effect on social performance: 
Conceptualization and empirical evidence”. Journal of Business Ethics, 112(3), 463-479. 
Harjoto, M., Laksmana, I., & Lee, R. 2014. “Board diversity and corporate social 
responsibility”. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-20.  
Higgs Report.  2003. Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors. London: 
Department for Trade and Industry. 
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. 2003. “Boards of directors and firm performance: integrating 
agency and resource dependence perspectives”. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 
383-396. 
Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A.A., & Harris, I. C. 2002. “Women and racial minorities in the 
boardroom: how do directors differ?”. Journal of Management, 28(6), 747-763. 
Hodge, K., Subramaniam, N., & Stewart, J. 2009. “Assurance of sustainability reports: impact 
on report users’ confidence and perceptions of information credibility”. Australian 
Accounting Review, 19(3), 178–194. 
GSQUAL PROOFREAD|Page 25 of 34 
 
Isidro, H., & Sobral, M. 2014. “The effects of women on corporate boards on firm value, 
financial performance, and ethical and social compliance”. Journal of Business Ethics, 1-
19. 
Junior, R. M., Best, P. J., & Cotter, J. 2014. “Sustainability reporting and assurance: a historical 
analysis on a world-wide phenomenon”. Journal of Business Ethics, 120(1), 1-11. 
KPMG. 2011. KPMG International Study of Corporate Sustainability Reporting. Amsterdam: 
Graduate Business School. 
Krishnan, G. V. & Parsons, L. M. 2008. “Getting to the bottom line: an exploration of gender 
and earnings quality”.  Journal of Business Ethics, 78(1-2), 65-76. 
Laksmana, I. 2008. “Corporate board governance and voluntary disclosure of executive 
compensation practices”. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(4), 1147-82. 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. D. 2003. “Earnings management and investor protection: 
an international comparison”. Journal of Financial Economics, 69(3), 505-527. 
Liao, L., Luo. L., & Tang, Q. 2015. “Gender diversity, board independence, environmental 
committee and greenhouse gas disclosure”. British Accounting Review, 47(4), 409-424. 
Manetti, G., & Becatti, L. 2009. “Assurance services for sustainability reports: standards and 
empirical evidence”. Journal of Business Ethics, 87(1), 289–298. 
Manetti, G., & Toccafondi, S. 2012. “The role of stakeholders in sustainability reporting 
assurance”. Journal of Business Ethics, 107(3), 363-377. 
Miller, T., & Triana, M. D. C. 2009. “Demographic diversity in the boardroom: Mediators of 
the board diversity–firm performance relationship”. Journal of Management Studies, 
46(5), 755-786. 
Mock, T. J., Rao, S. S., & Srivastava, R. P. 2013. “The development of worldwide sustainability 
reporting assurance”. Australian Accounting Review, 23(4), 280-294. 
GSQUAL PROOFREAD|Page 26 of 34 
 
Mock, T. J., Strohm, C., & Swartz, K. M. 2007. “An examination of worldwide assured 
sustainability reporting”. Australian Accounting Review, 17(1), 67–77. 
Nielsen, S., & Huse, M. 2010. “The contribution of women on boards of directors: Going 
beyond the surface”. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(2), 136-148. 
O'Brien, S. M. 2004. “Cutpoint selection for categorizing a continuous predictor”. Biometrics, 
60(2), 504-509. 
Ruhnke, K., & Gabriel, A. 2013. “Determinants of voluntary assurance on sustainability 
reports: an empirical analysis”. Journal of Business Economics, 83(9), 1063-1091. 
Simnett, R. 2012. “Assurance of sustainability reports”. Sustainability Accounting, Management 
and Policy Journal, 3(1), 89-98.  
Simnett, R. & Huggins, A. L. (2015). “Integrated reporting and assurance: where can research 
add value?” Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal, 6(1): 29-53. 
Simnett, R., Vanstraelen, A., & Chua, W.F. 2009. “Assurance on sustainability reports: an 
international comparison”. Accounting Review, 84(3), 937-967. 
Srinidhi, B., Gul, F. A., & Tsui, J. 2011. “Female directors and earnings quality”. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 28(5): 1610–1644. 
Terjesen, S., Sealy, R., & Singh, V. 2009. “Women directors on corporate boards: A review and 
research agenda”. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(3), 320-337. 
Triana, M. D. C., Miller, T. L., & Trzebiatowski, T. M. 2013. “The double-edged nature of board 
gender diversity: Diversity, firm performance, and the power of women directors as 
predictors of strategic change”. Organization Science, 25(2), 609-632. 
Turley, S., & Zaman, M. 2007. “Audit committee process: informal processes and behavioural 
effects”. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 20(5), 765-788. 
Zaman, M., Hudaib, M., & Haniffa, R. 2011. “Corporate governance quality, audit fees and 
non-audit services fees”. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 38(1-2), 165-197. 
GSQUAL PROOFREAD|Page 27 of 34 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Frequency of sustainability quality types 
SUSQUAL Scale 0 1 2 3 4 
Number of firms (% of firms) 173 (51.95%) 63 (18.91 %) 40 (12.01 %) 6 (1.80 %) 51 (15.32 %) 
 
  
N SUSQUAL ASS COMM BODFEM PRFEM BODINDFEM BLAU SHANNON BODSIZE BODIND BODMEET RI RB RE 
Panel B: All firms 
Mean 333 1.114 0.174 0.36 1.435 0.141 1.205 0.348 0.218 9.336 0.51 8.187 0.006 -2.835 3.233 
Median  333 0 0 0 1 0.142 1 0.41 0.244 9 0.571 8 0.025 -0.571 3.663 
Std.Dev.  333 1.472 0.379 0.48 1.012 0.104 0.929 0.213 0.143 2.656 0.275 2.723 0.496 9.237 1.257 
Maximum  333 4 1 1 5 0.571 5 0.69 0.5 21 1 20 1.239 -0.016 4.744 
Minimum  333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 -1.178 -66.469 0 
Panel C: Industry 
Oil & Gas 18 1.438 0.333 0.277 1.188 0.097 1.063 0.287 0.168 10.438 0.531 8.125 -0.126 -1.219 3.835 
Basic Materials  29 2.833 0.482 0.482 0.875 0.07 0.667 0.192 0.116 10.125 0.562 7.75 -0.099 -2..597 3.391 
Industrials  66 1.115 0.166 0.424 1.328 0.135 1.082 0.353 0.218 9.279 0.508 9.016 -0.126 -2.315 3.494 
Consumer Goods 24 1.522 0.166 0.625 1.739 0.172 1.435 0.406 0.261 9.565 0.476 8.304 -0.024 -0.870 3.778 
Health Care 8 1.25 0.125 0.5 2 0.166 2 0.388 0.253 10.625 0.568 9.75 -0.087 -0.303 3.827 
Consumer Services  57 0.891 0.123 0.315 1.618 0.163 1.291 0.403 0.257 9.545 0.463 8.364 -0.091 -0.932 3.804 
Telecommunications 9 1.333 0.222 0.555 2.167 0.156 1.5 0.376 0.265 9.833 0.418 8 0.186 -4.466 3.687 
Utilities  7 1.571 0.286 0.571 1.857 0.184 1.714 0.468 0.295 10.143 0.541 8.286 0.386 -0.493 3.937 
Financials  100 0.537 0.009 0.21 1.476 0.152 1.207 0.36 0.228 8.902 0.565 7.451 0.215 -7.233 2.264 
Technology  15 1.273 0.133 0.4 1.091 0.116 1 0.277 0.174 7.909 0.427 9.091 -0.422 -0.481 3.673 
SUSQUAL= sustainability report quality based on 0-4 scale [i.e. 0 = no existence of sustainability report; 1= if sustainability reports exist; 2= if sustainability reports exist and the company has a sustainability committee affiliated 
with the board of directors; 3= if sustainability reports exist and external assurance is provided by a non-audit firm; 4= if sustainability reports exist and external assurance provided by a Big4 or other audit firm]; ASSURANCE= 
takes the value of 1 in the case of sustainability being assured and 0 otherwise; COMMITTEE= takes the value of 1 in the case of existence of sustainability committee and 0 otherwise; BODFEM= number of female directors on 
board; PRFEM= proportion of female directors on board; BODINDFEM= number of independent female directors on board; SHANNON= Shannon index of diversity; BLAU= Blau index of diversity; BODSIZE= number of 
directors on board; BODIND= proportion of independent directors on board; BODMEET= number of board meetings; Reporting incentives (RI)= A single factor reflecting the strength of firm’s reporting incentives from various 
firm’s characteristics (i.e. size, leverage, return on assets, book to market ratio, percent of closely held shares, and percent of foreign sales); Reporting behaviour (RB)= the absolute value of accruals scaled by the absolute value 
of cash flows from operations; Reporting environment (RE)= the natural log of the number of analysts following the firm. 
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FEMALE=0 denotes firms with no females on the board; FEMALE=1 firms with one female director on the board; 
FEMALE>1 firms with more than one female on the board. SUSQUAL= sustainability report quality based on 0-4 scale [i.e. 0 = 
no existence of sustainability report; 1= if sustainability reports exist; 2= if sustainability reports exist and the company has a 
sustainability committee affiliated with the board of directors; 3= if sustainability reports exist and external assurance is provided 
by a non-audit firm; 4= if sustainability reports exist and external assurance provided by a  Big 4 or other audit firm]; BODSIZE= 
number of directors on board; BODIND= proportion of independent directors on board; BODMEET= number of board meetings; 
Reporting incentives (RI)= A single factor reflecting the strength of firm’s reporting incentives from various firm’s characteristics 
(i.e. size, leverage, return on assets, book to market ratio, percent of closely held shares, and percent of foreign sales); Reporting 
behaviour (RB)= the absolute value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flows from operations; Reporting environment 
(RE)= the natural log of the number of analysts following the firm. 
 
  
Panel D: Number of Female Directors 
 
 N % of 
total  
SUSQUAL BODSIZE BODIND BODMEET RI  RB  RE  
          
FEMALE=0          
Mean  75 22.522% 0.844 7.351 0.463 7.372 -0.167 -8.868 2.648 
Median  75 22.522% 0 7 0.571 7 -0.149 -0.646 3.044 
Std.Dev 75 22.522% 1.436 1.904 0.336 2.572 0.379 9.683 1.355 
Minimum  75 22.522% 0 4 0 2 -0.955 -34.807 0 
Maximum  75 22.522% 4 13 1 14 0.673 -0.065 4.369 
FEMALE=1           
Mean  113 33.933% 1.026 8.973 0.481 8.354 0.013 -1.811 3.160 
Median  113 33.933% 0 9 0.538 8 0.002 -0.657 3.611 
Std.Dev 113 33.933% 1.435 2.225 0.271 2.868 0.501 4.170 1.259 
Minimum  113 33.933% 0 4 0 3 -1.178 -34.807 0 
Maximum  113 33.933% 4 16 1 18 1.239 -0.016 4.454 
FEMALE>1          
Mean  145 43.543% 1.298 10.572 0.547 8.344 0.051 -4.529 3.494 
Median  145 43.543% 1 10 0.625 8 0.116 -0.542 3.912 
Std.Dev 145 43.543% 1.482 2.618 0.256 2.531 0.520 3.921 1.143 
Minimum  145 43.543% 0 5 0 4 -1.154 -66.469 0 
Maximum  145 43.543% 4 21 1 19 1.115 -0.01 4.744 
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
 
  SUSQUAL BODFEM BODSIZE BODIND BODMEET RI RB RI 
Panel A: Gender measured by BODFEM  
SUSQUAL 
BODFEM 
BODSIZE 
BODIND 
BODMEET 
SIZE 
ROA 
LEV 
SUSQUAL 1.000        
BODFEM     0.170*** 1.000       
BODSIZE 0.351*** 0.486*** 1.000      
BODIND 0.115** 0.115** 0.101* 1.000     
BODMEET 0.147*** 0.058 0.196*** -0.004 1.000    
RI 0.197*** 0.220 0.177 0.126 0.041 1.000   
RB 0.130** 0.108* 0.140** 0.006 0.101* -0.360*** 1.000  
RE 0.381*** 0.372*** 0.494*** 0.168*** 0.197*** 0.168*** 0.271*** 1.000 
 
Panel B: Gender measured by BODINDFEM 
SUSQUAL 1.000        
BODINDFEM 0.188*** 1.000       
BODSIZE 0.344*** 0.465*** 1.000      
BODIND 0.104*** 0.209*** 0.090*** 1.000     
BODMEET 0.142** 0.069 0.191*** -0.019 1.000    
RI 0.201*** 0.272*** 0.174*** 0.127** 0.038 1.000   
RB 0.120** 0.098* 0.131** -0.012 0.085 -0.368*** 1.000  
RE 0.378*** 0.396*** 0.491*** 0.155*** 0.181*** 0.166*** 0.256*** 1.000 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
SUSQUAL= sustainability report quality based on 0-4 score; BODFEM= number of female directors on board; BODINDFEM= 
number of independent female directors on board; BODSIZE= number of directors on board; BODIND= proportion of 
independent directors on board; BODMEET= number of board meetings;  Reporting incentives (RI)= A single factor reflecting 
the strength of firm’s reporting incentives from various firm’s characteristics (i.e. size (total asset), leverage, return on assets, 
book to market ratio, percent of closely held shares, and percent of foreign sales); Reporting behaviour (RB)= the absolute value 
of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flows from operations; Reporting environment (RE)= the natural log of the 
number of analysts following the firm. 
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Table 3 Sustainability Reporting Quality and Gender Diversity 
Panel A: All firms (n=333) 
DV= SUSQUAL Model 
3.1 
Model 
3.2 
Model 
3.3 
Model 
3.4 
Model 
3.5 
Model 
3.6 
Model 
3.7 
Model 
3.8 
Model 
3.9 
Model 
3.10 
           
BODFEM 0.137*     0.239***     
PRFEM  0.588     0.933    
BODINDFEM   0.154*     0.258***   
BLAU    0.576     0.971**  
SHANNON     0.351     0.678** 
BODSIZE 0.099**
* 
0.112*** 0.098*** 0.108*** 0.108***      
BODIND 0.095 0.12 0.043 0.123 0.128 0.175 0.234 0.039 0.230 0.232 
BODMEET 0.034 0.015 0.035 0.015 0.015 0.041 0.015 0.043 0.016 0.016 
RI 0.582**
* 
0.572*** 0.572*** 0.573*** 0.568*** 0.626*** 0.668*** 0.586*** 0.664*** 0.656*** 
RB  -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 
RE  0.195* 0.211* 0.191 0.212* 0.211* 0.291** 0.334*** 0.273** 0.327*** 0.323*** 
Oil & Gas 1.027**
* 
0.862*** 1.010*** 0.867** 0.856** 0.979*** 0.759** 0.967*** 0.773*** 0.766** 
Basic Materials 2.148**
* 
1.841*** 2.147*** 1.861*** 1.853*** 2.115*** 1.732*** 2.145*** 1.771*** 1.778*** 
Industrials 0.803**
* 
0.676*** 0.819*** 0.675*** 0.670*** 0.704*** 0.540** 0.705*** 0.545** 0.542** 
Consumer Goods 1.081**
* 
0.992*** 1.085*** 0.985*** 0.987*** 0.953*** 0.817*** 0.938*** 0.816*** 0.821*** 
Health Care 0.631 0.589 0.58 0.586 0.591 0.546 0.535 0.461 0.533 0.543 
Consumer Services 0.363 0.265 0.372 0.257 0.267 0.222 0.089 0.231 0.083 0.094 
Telecommunication 0.671* 1.039** 0.558 1.116** 1.116** 0.528 0.698 0.394 0.809* 0.813 
Utilities 0.707* 0.606 0.684 0.591 0.592 0.579* 0.437 0.546 0.421 0.419 
Technologies 1.136**
* 
0.956** 1.110*** 0.951** 0.948** 0.863** 0.622* 0.864** 0.633 0.637* 
Pseudo R2 0.159 0.145 0.145 0.157 0.145 0.151 0.133 0.147 0.135 0.134 
Wald χ2 91.25 94.38 88.61 94.54 94.06 81.65 73.81 76.20 76.24 76.14 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, all models are tested using ordered-Probit specifications, Financials dropped from the regression for collinearity issue.  
Notes: dependent variable SUSQUAL= sustainability report quality based on 0-4 score; BODFEM= number of female directors on board; PRFEM= proportion of female directors on board; 
BODINDFEM= number of independent female directors on board; SHANNON= Shannon index of diversity; BLAU= Blau index of diversity; BODSIZE= number of directors on board; BODIND= 
proportion of independent directors on board; BODMEET= number of board meetings; Reporting incentives (RI)= A single factor reflecting the strength of firm’s reporting incentives from various 
firm’s characteristics (i.e. size, leverage, return on assets, book to market ratio, percent of closely held shares, and percent of foreign sales); Reporting behaviour (RB)= the absolute value of accruals 
scaled by the absolute value of cash flows from operations; Reporting environment (RE)= the natural log of the number of analysts following the firm. 
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Panel B: Small firms (n=199) 
 
Large Firms (n=134) 
DV= SUSQUAL Model 3.11 Model 3.12 Model 3.13 Model 3.14 Model 3.15 Model 3.16  Model 3.17 Model 3.18 Model 3.19 Model 3.20  
BODFEM 
 
0.299**     0.193*     
PRFEM 
 
 2.566*     0.460    
BODINDFEM 
  
  0.424***     0.228*   
BLAU 
 
   2.617**     0.248  
SHANNON 
 
    1.944**     0.028 
BODSIZE 
 
0.067 0.112** 0.064 0.106** 0.102** 0.214*** 0.218*** 0.209*** 0.217*** 0.220*** 
BODIND 
 
-0.321 -0.324 -0.88 -0.453 -0.459 0.517 0.395 0.472 0.393 0.392 
BODMEET 
 
0.068 0.061 0.076 0.066 0.065 0.022 0.004 0.024 0.004 0.004 
RI 0.648** 0.653** 0.566** 0.661** 0.666** 0.104* 0.268 0.104* 0.269 0.265 
RB 
 
-0.109* -0.108* -0.110* -0.116* -0.121 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.002 
RE 
 
0.173 0.184 0.151 0.199 0.209 0.027 0.005 0.041 0.007 0.012 
Oil & Gas 
 
0.935 0.898 0.949* 0.924* 0.911 1.616*** 1.178** 1.596*** 0.161** 1.138** 
Basic Materials 
 
2.011*** 1.964*** 2.149*** 2.122*** 2.185*** 3.142*** 2.122*** 3.114*** 2.101*** 2.074*** 
Industrials 
 
0.785* 0.789* 0.751* 0.832** 0.845** 1.102*** 0.781*** 1.129*** 0.768*** 0.760*** 
Consumer Goods 
 
0.932** 0.932** 1.005** 0.941** 0.968** 1.458*** 1.209*** 1.430*** 1.194*** 1.189*** 
Health Care 
 
-0.113 0.008 -0.372 -0.031 0.004 2.001*** 1.556*** 1.971*** 1.532*** 1.506*** 
Consumer Services 
 
0.039 0.037 0.044 0.023 0.034 0.998*** 0.704** 1.015*** 0.697** 0.733** 
Telecommunication 
 
0.445 0.513 0.233 0.447 0.484 1.182*** 1.431*** 1.260*** 1.415*** 1.407*** 
Utilities 
 
0.201 0.192 0.121 0.158 0.159 7.406*** 6.903*** 7.339*** 6.897*** 6.890*** 
Technologies 
 
1.188*** 1.152*** 1.095* 1.101* 1.107* 1.460** 0.968* 1.422** 0.948* 0.922 
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.132 0.142 0.141 0.143 0.197 0.155 0.194 0.155 0.155 
Wald χ2 66.49 68.72 65.15 67.07 65.73 51.95 49.68 50.99 49.85 50.17 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, all models are tested using ordered-Probit specifications, Financials dropped from the regression for collinearity issue. 
Notes: dependent variable SUSQUAL= sustainability report quality based on 0-4 score; BODFEM= number of female directors on board; PRFEM= proportion of female directors on board; 
BODINDFEM= number of independent female directors on board; SHANNON= Shannon index of diversity; BLAU= Blau index of diversity; BODSIZE= number of directors on board; BODIND= 
proportion of independent directors on board; BODMEET= number of board meetings; Reporting incentives (RI)= A single factor reflecting the strength of firm’s reporting incentives from various 
firm’s characteristics (i.e. size, leverage, return on assets, book to market ratio, percent of closely held shares, and percent of foreign sales); Reporting behaviour (RB)= the absolute value of accruals 
scaled by the absolute value of cash flows from operations; Reporting environment (RE)= the natural log of the number of analysts following the firm.  
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Table 4 Additional Analysis: Sustainability Reporting Quality and Gender Diversity 
 
BODSIZE Categorised  
 
DV= SUSQUAL Model 4.1 Model 4.2 Model 4.3 Model 4.4 Model 4.5 
BODFEM 0.172** 
    
PRFEM 
 
 
0.743 
   
BODINDFEM 
  
  
0.187** 
  
BLAU 
 
   
0.722* 
 
SHANNON 
 
    
0.476* 
BODSIZE 
 
     
0 base Base base base base 
1 3.517*** 3.637*** 3.560*** 3.619*** 3.616*** 
2 3.768*** 3.938*** 3.825*** 3.898*** 3.887*** 
3 4.241*** 4.509*** 4.284*** 4.466*** 4.455*** 
BODIND 
 
0.062 0.091 0.001 0.095 0.101 
BODMEET 
 
0.038 0.013 0.039 0.014 0.013 
RI 0.599*** 0.628*** 0.586*** 0.626*** 0.621*** 
RB 
 
-0.007 -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 
RE 
 
0.235** 0.254*** 0.231** 0.252** 0.251** 
Oil & Gas 
 
1.028*** 0.848** 1.004*** 0.855** 0.844** 
Basic Materials 
 
2.160*** 1.836*** 2.155*** 1.859*** 1.855*** 
Industrials 
 
0.771*** 0.641** 0.786*** 0.641** 0.634*** 
Consumer Goods 
 
1.019*** 0.907*** 1.016*** 0.903*** 0.904*** 
Health Care 
 
0.585 0.552 0.526 0.548 0.554 
Consumer Services 
 
0.320 0.212 0.331 0.202 0.210 
Telecommunication 
 
0.642 0.818* 0.518 0.886** 0.888* 
Utilities 
 
0.687 0.568 0.660 0.552 0.551* 
Technologies 
 
1.020** 0.824** 0.990** 0.821** 0.819** 
Pseudo R2 0.154 0.139 0.153 0.141 0.139 
Wald χ2 106.66 98.48 101.44 98.06 97.84 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, all models are tested using ordered-Probit specifications, Financials dropped from 
the regression for collinearity issue. 
Notes: dependent variable SUSQUAL= sustainability report quality based on 0-4 score; BODFEM= number of female directors 
on board; PRFEM= proportion of female directors on board; BODINDFEM= number of independent female directors on board; 
SHANNON= Shannon index of diversity; BLAU= Blau index of diversity; BODSIZE= number of directors on board [BODSIZE 
is divided into four-level categories, i.e. 0, 1-7, 8-10, 11-14 and 15-21]; BODIND= proportion of independent directors on board; 
BODMEET= number of board meetings; Reporting incentives (RI)= A single factor reflecting the strength of firm’s reporting 
incentives from various firm’s characteristics (i.e. size, leverage, return on assets, book to market ratio, percent of closely held 
shares, and percent of foreign sales); Reporting behaviour (RB)= the absolute value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of 
cash flows from operations; Reporting environment (RE)= the natural log of the number of analysts following the firm. 
  
GSQUAL v07-06-2016|Page 33 of 34 
 
Table 5 Additional Analysis: Sustainability Assurance and Gender Diversity  
 
 
DV= ASSURANCE Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 5.3 Model 5.4 Model 5.5 Model 5.6 
BODFEM 
 
1.280** 
(2.63) 
    
PRFEM 
 
 0.465 
(0.48) 
   
BODINDFEM  
 
  1.240** 
(2.35) 
  
BLAU 
 
   0.781 
(0.94) 
 
SHANNON 
 
    0.857 
(1.07) 
BODSIZE 
 
1.130**      
BODIND 
 
0.882 0.826 1.097 0.75 1.108 1.107 
BODMEET 
 
0.992 1.054 0.996 1.043 0.999 0.999 
RI 
 
3.293*** 3.569*** 3.644*** 3.365*** 3.649*** 3.635*** 
RB 
 
0.996 0.975 0.996 0.977 0.997 0.997 
RE 
 
1.492* 1.947* 1.866* 1.910* 1.856* 1.853* 
Oil & Gas 
 
5.792** 8.082*** 4.729** 7.472*** 4.850** 4.858** 
Basic Materials  
 
15.111*** 23.421*** 11.703*** 22.401*** 12.099*** 12.086*** 
Industrials  
 
2.824* 3.396** 2.283 3.402*** 2.284 2.281 
Consumer Goods 
 
1.963 2.264** 1.615 2.212 1.599 1.595 
Health Care 
 
1.337 1.417 1.332 1.353 1.304 1.296 
Consumer Services  
 
1.409 1.471 1.103 1.472 1.095 1.102 
Telecommunication 
 
2.129 0.985 1.717 1.077 2.232 2.229 
Utilities  
 
2.508 2.809 2.068 2.673 2.047 2.046 
Technologies  
 
4.054 4.265 2.663 4.012 2.682 2.671 
_cons -5.037*** -5.911*** -4.513*** -5.541*** -4.576*** -4.571*** 
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.187 0.162 0.182 0.163 0.162 
Wald χ2 39.75 35.66 32.81 34.46 33.34 33.17 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, all models are tested using Logistic regression, Financials dropped from the 
regression for collinearity issue. 
Notes: dependent variable ASSURANCE= 1 if sustainability report is externally assured, 0 otherwise; BODFEM= number of 
female directors on board; PRFEM= proportion of female directors on board; BODINDFEM= number of independent female 
directors on board; SHANNON= Shannon index of diversity; BLAU= Blau index of diversity; BODSIZE= number of directors on 
board; BODIND= proportion of independent directors on board; BODMEET= number of board meetings; Reporting incentives 
(RI)= A single factor reflecting the strength of firm’s reporting incentives from various firm’s characteristics (i.e. size, leverage, 
return on assets, book to market ratio, percent of closely held shares, and percent of foreign sales); Reporting behaviour (RB)= 
the absolute value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flows from operations; Reporting environment (RE)= the 
natural log of the number of analysts following the firm. 
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Table 6 Additional analysis: Sustainability Committee and Gender Diversity  
 
DV=COMMITTEE Model 6.1 Model 6.2 Model 6.3 Model 6.4 Model 6.5 Model 6.6 
BODFEM 
 
1.381** 
(2.63) 
    
PRFEM 
 
 3.606** 
(0.48) 
   
BODINDFEM  
 
  1.423** 
(2.35) 
  
BLAU 
 
   0..774** 
(0.94) 
 
SHANNON 
 
    1.239** 
(1.07) 
BODSIZE 
 
1.130**      
BODIND 
 
0.882 0.539 0.497 0.453 0.476 0.478 
BODMEET 
 
0.992 1.055 1.044 1.071 1.044 1.043 
RI 
 
3.293*** 1.828* 1.910** 1.753** 1.882** 1.852** 
RB 
 
0.996 1.007 0.991* 1.006 0.990* 0.990* 
RE 
 
1.492* 1.331* 1.527** 1.307 1.490** 1.475** 
Oil & Gas 
 
5.792** 1.328 1.333 1.29 1.377 1.35 
Basic Materials  
 
15.111*** 5.491*** 4.595*** 5.135*** 5.055*** 5.169*** 
Industrials  
 
2.824* 2.719** 2.639** 2.585** 2.716** 2.698** 
Consumer Goods 
 
1.963 4.479*** 4.837*** 4.394*** 4.944*** 5.016*** 
Health Care 
 
1.337 2.53 2.876 2.174 2.92 2.995 
Consumer Services  
 
1.409 1.288 1.228 1.273 1.227 1.25 
Telecommunication 
 
2.129 2.56 2.324 1.789 1.845 1.86 
Utilities  
 
2.508 2.774 2.695 2.642 2.622 2.614 
Technologies  
 
4.054 2.668 2.355 2.753 2.44 2.479 
_cons -3.470*** -2.796*** -3.188*** -2.691*** -3.288*** -3.496*** 
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.115 0.122 0.112 0.125 0.126 
Wald χ2 36.62 39.62 42.92 38.10 44.94 45.01 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1, all models are tested using Logistic regression, Financials dropped from the 
regression for collinearity issue. 
Notes: dependent variable COMMITTEE= 1 if sustainability committee exists, 0 otherwise; BODFEM= number of female 
directors on board; PRFEM= proportion of female directors on board; BODINDFEM= number of independent female directors 
on board; SHANNON= Shannon index of diversity; BLAU= Blau index of diversity; BODSIZE= number of directors on board; 
BODIND= proportion of independent directors on board; BODMEET= number of board meetings; Reporting incentives (RI)= A 
single factor reflecting the strength of firm’s reporting incentives from various firm’s characteristics (i.e. size, leverage, return on 
assets, book to market ratio, percent of closely held shares, and percent of foreign sales); Reporting behaviour (RB)= the absolute 
value of accruals scaled by the absolute value of cash flows from operations; Reporting environment (RE)= the natural log of the 
number of analysts following the firm. 
 
